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This Article assesses that part of the legal obligation to provide for compensatory 
habitat under Article 6(4) of the EU Habitats Directive which requires an opinion 
from the European Commission. This is located within a wider ‗impact neutrality‘ 
context where such offsetting measures are increasingly being advanced. The 
literature on compensatory habitat, some of which relates to site-specific measures 
and some to habitat ‗banking‘, is considered in order to map how compensatory 
measures may be prone to failure. This is done against the criteria of functionality, 
proponent bias, monitoring and enforceability, and economic influence. These are 
then used to evaluate the Commission‘s opinions under the Directive. While the 
compensation obligation is to be applauded, the Commission‘s opinions fare poorly 
against all these criteria, a common, and important, thread being a lack of 
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There are elements of an ever increasing aspiration in environmental regulation  (I 
hesitate to call it a trend) to move away from justifying harm to the natural 
environment because of non-environmental gains. Trading natural capital for 
economic and social capital no longer commands the persuasive force it once had. In 
its place is an ethos under which natural resources may only be interfered with if 
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functional equivalents are provided. I term this an ‗ecological impact neutrality‘ 
approach.  
 
At the EU level, the most longstanding example of this approach is in the obligation, 
under the 1992 Habitats Directive,
1
 to compensate, in the face of development, for 
certain losses to the Natura 2000 network of protected sites. The obligation is 
activated, as part of a sequential approach, after due attention has been given to 
prevention and mitigation and to alternatives (ie the obligation is to compensate 
unavoidable losses). It is an obligation which the Directive does not qualify by any 
test of ‗best‘ or ‗reasonable‘ endeavours. And in the case of ‗priority‘ sites (priority 
attaching to habitats which are more endangered, or habitats of species whose natural 
range falls predominantly within the EU), the European Commission is required to 
issue an opinion to the Member State concerned if a development is to be justified on 
public interest grounds.  
 
Whilst facilitating development, the duty to compensate is therefore a mandatory, and 
seemingly cost-oblivious, requirement, traceable back three decades to the seminal 
Leybucht case
2
 and hence in principle the obligation has been a constant feature of the 
law. But what does this sparsely worded obligation entail? How has the Commission 
interpreted the obligation in its Guidance? And, crucially, what has the practice of the 
Commission been when issuing its opinions? Furthermore, is the position any 
different from when the first opinions were issued in 1995, which Nollkaemper fairly 
described as having taken ‗only a soft glance at the adequacy of compensation‘?3 
 
In this article I consider these questions using as my primary data the 15 opinions of 
the European Commission publicly issued up to 31 July 2011 under Article 6(4) 
paragraph 2 of the Habitats Directive. Although these opinions have received some 
academic scrutiny, this has mainly focused on the exercise of the Commission‘s 
judgement, under this provision, about whether harmful development is nevertheless 
justified for imperative reasons of overriding public interest.
4
 The nature of the 
compensation obligation has received much less attention, and its application in 
                                                 
1
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora [1992] OJ L206/7 (‗the Habitats Directive‘). 
2
 Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-883 (‗Leybucht‘). 
3
 A Nollkaemper, ‗Habitat Protection in EC Law: Evolving Conceptions of a Balance of Interests‘ 
(1997) 9 JEL 271, 283. 
4
 Nollkaemper (n 3) 279-283; N de Sadeleer, ‗Habitats Conservation in EC Law – From Nature 
Sanctuaries to Ecological Networks‘ (2004) 5 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 215, 248-
250. L Krämer, ‗The European Commission's Opinions under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive‘ 
(2009) 21 JEL 59. 
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practice seems to have attracted almost no scholarly attention whatsoever.
5
 The 
practice of the Commission under the Directive in relation to compensation, then, has 
also received something of a cursory glance in the literature. 
 
Habitat compensation raises a range of ethical, legal and policy concerns about how 
best to maintain and improve ecological functions and services, and respect ecological 
values (often over considerable distances of time and space) and about how ecological 
values and services are given due weight in decision-making processes. 
Compensating habitat loss raises some profound questions about commensurability 
and fungibility; of valuation; and of regulatory flexibility, discretion, monitoring, 
enforcement and follow-through. My concern here is not primarily with whether 
compensation is effective, which is a difficult question to answer one way or the other 
looking at the sample selected, not least because of the time frames involved in 
creating new habitat and assessing its ecological functionality.
6
 My concern is more 
about process and design than about likely outcome, and the extent to which the 
ecological values expressed in the Habitats Directive are respected. Given that Natura 
2000 sites represent the most highly valued habitats in the EU, and that the opinion of 
the Commission is only sought with respect to priority sites, the lack of detailed 
scrutiny of the Commission‘s opinions with respect to compensation is remarkable.  
 
1.1 Method and Structure  
 
The 15 opinions issued by the Commission up to July 2011
7
 were evaluated, 
alongside discussion with relevant Commission officials
8
 and further literature 
review. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that the Article 6(4) opinions are not the 
only, or even the main, instance when habitat compensation obligations arise under 
the Directive. EU Member States have obligations under Article 6(4) first paragraph 
                                                 
5
 The most considered and systematic discussion is in Krämer (n 4) although the emphasis there is 
more on justifications for site selection and for development. Compensation issues are the specific 
focus of F Haumont, ‗L‘application des mesures compensatoires prévues par Natura 2000‘ (2009) 10 
ERA Forum 611–624. 
6
 Though some would like to answer the question of effectiveness, see Natural Capital Initiative (2010) 
Addressing practical challenges for biodiversity offsetting in the UK. Summary report for policy 
makers on the first ‗Towards no net loss, and beyond‘ workshop, 22nd June 2010, 6 (‗Current policy, 
such as the Habitats Directive, is effective in requiring compensatory measures where it is deemed that 
impacts of development projects on Natura 2000 sites cannot be avoided‘). For perhaps the best ex post 
evaluation of the compensatory measures involved in one Commission opinion, see Ecologic, 
Compensation for Development of the Airbus Facility within the Mühlenberger Loch, Germany (2008), 
available at <www.envliability.eu>  accessed 16 December 2011, discussed in section 5. 
7
 Since then 2 further opinions have been published. The opinions are available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/opinion_en.htm> accessed 16 
December 2011. 
8
 Conducted in Spring 2006 and relating only to the first two phases. Discussion was with a group of 
Commission officials who had dealt with or were then dealing with the issuing of opinions. 
 4 
to compensate and notify the Commission (but not seek its opinion) when ‗non-
priority‘ habitats are involved. The sample selected is therefore likely to be an 





The completeness of the published opinions does not seem to be in doubt.
10
 However, 
in at least one further development a ‗preliminary opinion‘ has been sought, 
seemingly to give guidance on whether Article 6(4) would be triggered.
11
 
Furthermore, the compensation duty may be evaded, and hence never addressed under 
Article 6(4) paragraph 2. The prior assessment of plans and projects which comes 
before Article 6(4), termed ‗appropriate assessment, ought to identify any significant 
effects of the development, and assess whether these will affect site integrity. But it 
operates weakly in practice.
12
 As the Commission has found: 
 
Member States are struggling with the development of appropriate assessments as required 
under Article 6(3). ... [T]he assessments of the effects of projects are frequently vague and too 
general. The Commission is concerned by the way biodiversity matters and nature aspects are 
addressed. Given that the evaluation of impacts determines what needs to be compensated, 




                                                 
9
 In the period 2007-2010, 21 projects were notified to the Commission, see 
<http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/env/monnat/library?l=/expert_reporting/meeting_24112011/presentat
ions&vm=detailed&sb=Title> accessed 16 December 2011, whereas during this period 3 opinions were 
published. Similarly, in the period 2001-2006 in the UK compensatory measures were judged 
necessary in 16 cases, but no opinions were sought, see Joint Nature Conservation Committee, Second 
Report by the UK under Article 17 on the implementation of the Habitats Directive from January 2001 
to December 2006 (JNCC 2007), 6.1. Available at <www.jncc.gov.uk/article17>, accessed 16 
December 2011.  
10
 Personal communication, DG Environment, 19 December 2011. 
11
 Development of the Markermeer-IJmeer shallow-lake ecosystem, Netherlands, discussed in J 
Verschuuren ‗Climate Change: Rethinking Restoration in the European Union‘s Birds and Habitats 
Directives‘ (2010) 28 Ecological Restoration 431, 433. As the author points out, it is not clear that the 
Court of Justice would support this approach, because it seems to go against the sequential approach to 
compensation, under which compensation only comes into play when a negative impact is inevitable 
and there are deemed to be overriding public interests reasons for proceeding. For support for this 
interpretation see Case C-239/04 Commission v Portugal [2006] ECR I-10183 (‗Castro Verde‘), 
opinion of Advocate-General Kokott at [35]:  
 
12
 See also C Backes, A Freriks and A Nijmeijer, Article 6 Habitats Directive – A Comparative Law 
Study on the Implementation of Art. 6 Habitats Directive in Some Member States (Centre for 
Environmental Law and Policy/NILOS 2006) 77. 
13
 Directorate General Environment, Implementation of Article 6(4), First Subparagraph, 
of Council Directive 92/43/EEC During the Period 2004-2006: Summary Report (European 
Commission, 30 June 2008), 3, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/knowledge/rep_habitats/docs/art_6_4.pdf> accessed 16 
December 2011. 
 5 
Clearly, such shortcomings with assessment frustrate the sequential approach to 
decision-making, under which compensation issues should only be addressed as a last 
resort, and reduce the number of cases which should call for an opinion.  
 
Neither of these caveats, however, seems to detract significantly from the basic 
methodological point that all the opinions which have been issued are publicised and 
that these provide the most detailed practical indication we have of the Commission‘s 
interpretation of its legal obligations and of what it considers adequate compensation 
to be.
14
 There is simply no better sample that can be used to test the Commission‘s 
practical understanding and of the law in action. Moreover, this understanding can 
reasonably be assumed to influence its obligations in scrutinising the much larger 
number of cases relating to non-priority sites where Member States are required not to 
request an opinion but simply to notify the Commission.  
 
This article is structured in six sections. Section 2 looks at the rise of impact neutrality 
with regard to biodiversity, while section 3 considers some of the challenges with 
ecological modes of compensation, in particular with regard to devising an 
appropriate ‗currency‘ and with certain biases associated with habitat compensation. 
In the light of this analysis, a number of propositions are established. Section 4 then 
considers the Habitats Directive regime, while section 5 evaluates the opinions issued 
by the European Commission against the propositions outlined in section 3. Section 6 
draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2.  The Rise of Impact Neutrality  
 
Based on stronger sustainability theories,
15
 an ecologically-driven model of 
compensation has arisen. This aims at ensuring that development with adverse 
ecological impacts which cannot be avoided, reduced or mitigated should only be 
permitted where steps are taken to ensure that there is no net loss of nature 
conservation interests. This is part of a more general reorientation. As Fischmann and 
J Hall-Rivera have argued:  
 
                                                 
14
 The Natura 2000 regime may also require ecological compensation as a requirement of more general 
habitat conservation measures, or as a means to meet legal tests relating to species protection (under art 
6(2) Habitats Directive and art 3 Wild Bird Directives, and arts 12-16 Habitats Directive, respectively). 
It is not necessary to consider these here because these do not expressly engage the Commission in 
issuing an opinion.  
15
 E Neumeyer, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms 
(3
rd
 rev edn, Edward Elgar 2010). 
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‗In the coming decades, approaches to conserving biological diversity that merely mitigate 
harm or abate damage will increasingly reveal themselves inadequate. Restoration and 
recovery will be the hallmarks of any successful biodiversity strategy.‘16  
 
The central provision with which this article is concerned is Article 6(4) of the 
Habitats Directive, discussed in more detail in section 4. But a further, more recent, 
example of this orientation is provided by the obligations under the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive which in defined circumstances requires ecological 
compensation, and under which off-site ecological compensation may be required if 





There are some similarities between the Environmental Liability Directive and the 
Habitats Directive insofar as neither permits the exchange of natural with non-natural 
resources.
18
 There is also a commonality in terms of some of the valuation and 
restorative techniques used. But there are also some important differences. Under the 
Habitats Directive scheme, the compensation obligation is forward-looking. By 
contrast, although the Environmental Liability Directive also requires preventive 
action in response to the threat of imminent harm, it does not in general terms require 
deliberative evaluation of the kind envisaged under the Habitats Directive. Both the 
Environmental Liability Directive and Habitats Directive regimes, then, tap into 
aspects of the curative legal model described by de Sadeleer under which ‗everything 
is seen as capable of being indemnified, replaced, repaid, compensated‘.19 Without 
downplaying the similarities, however, the far greater ex ante focus of the Habitats 
Directive seems to engage a somewhat different set of issues. For example, it seems 
                                                 
16
 R Fischmann and J Hall-Rivera ‗A Lesson For Conservation From Pollution Control Law: 
Cooperative Federalism For Recovery Under The Endangered Species Act‘ 27 Columbia Journal of 
Environmental Law 45, 47. 
17
 Under Annex II of the EU Environmental Liability Directive (Directive 2004/35/EC of 21 April 
2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage 
[2004] OJ L143/56) a sequential approach to environmental remediation following accidental damage 
is to be taken. In the case of damage to water or to Natura 2000 sites, the primary responsibility is to 
restore the damaged natural resource and/or impaired services by returning them to, or towards, 
‗baseline conditions‘. Primary remediation can be either active remediation or natural recovery. To the 
extent that primary remediation does not fully restore the damaged natural resources and/or services to 
baseline conditions, ‗complimentary remediation‘ is required. Complimentary remediation, which in 
the language of this article is a compensatory measure, applies where remediation is impossible or 
primary remediation on site is disproportionate relative to benefits. Finally, ‗compensatory 
remediation‘, compensating for the interim loss of natural resources and services pending recovery, 
must always be carried out. If primary remediation is achieved by natural recovery then obviously 
compensatory remediation costs will be higher. 
18
 Environmental Liability Directive (n 17) Annex II, 1.2.3 (monetary valuation techniques may be 
used to determine equivalents, but compensation must be ecological not monetary). 
19
 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 15 (in 
which he somewhat narrowly identifies private liability rather than administrative law as the central 
legal tool here, while also acknowledging the need for preventive controls to go beyond this). 
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perfectly reasonable to approach issues of ecological valuation differently depending 
on whether one is acting prospectively than when, say, one is responding to an 




For Owens and Cowell, discussing developments in UK land use planning policy over 
the 1990s, the development of the sustainability agenda in relation to conservation 
was not explainable simply because the discourse of ‗natural capital‘ allowed 
biodiversity to develop a ‗neo-material rationale‘. These developments: 
 
cannot be fully rationalised in terms of instrumental or utilitarian thinking; in places, it reflects 
and implements a more ecocentric ethic, or a strong sense that appreciating intrinsic value in 
nature is constitutive of good human lives and societies. When, for example, it is ruled that 
…compensation is an inappropriate substitute for conservation in situ, the implication is that 
certain benefits do not ‗count‘ if, in order to attain them, an obligation to protect the site 
would have to be breached. Thus the institutional arrangements for the most important sites do 
not just give nature conservation greater weight; they effectively remove the habitat from an 
arena of simple trade-off, creating a framework in which judgement must be exercised about 




In terms of a reorientation of law and policy, this particular kind of ‗ecological impact 
neutral‘ approach also appears distinct from, for example, the pursuit of an optimum 
or ‗best‘ environmental harm reduction strategy based on reasonable efforts.22 
Moreover, as an obligation which bites on specific plans and projects, it differs from 
more strategically focused measures which, as a general principle, aspire towards 
impact neutrality but which do not require that any particular decision contributes, to 
any particular extent, towards this objective.
23
 In addition, its status as a binding legal 
obligation distinguishes it from similar approaches found elsewhere only as strategic, 
policy aspirations. In the field of nature conservation, such ambitions include that 
there be ‗no net loss of biodiversity‘, on which the EU, like the rest of the world, has 
                                                 
20
 Eg, a response after an incident cannot take a sequential approach, and hence cannot narrow the 
scope of any compensation duty. 
21
 S Owens and R Cowell, Land and Limits (Routledge 2002) 123. See also C Miller, ‗Attributing 
―Priority‖ to Habitats‘ (1997) 6 Environmental Values 341, 346, in which the authors note that ‗even if 
that assignment [of priority] does not amount to the recognition of a clear ecocentric right, it does 
represent some erosion of the anthropocentric hegemony‘. 
22
 For an interesting  discussion of this in the context of EU pollution prevention and control legislation 
see R (Rockware Glass Ltd) v Chester City Council [2005] EWHC 2250; [2006] EWCA Civ 992 
(concerning in part whether the obligation was to minimise pollution to an ‗irreducible minimum‘ or to 
achieve a high level of environmental protection, and upholding a precautionary approach). 
23
 eftec, IEEP and others (2010) The Use of Market-based Instruments for Biodiversity Protection –The 
Case of Habitat Banking – Technical Report <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/index.htm> 
accessed 27 July 2011, 16 (‗there appears to be a gap in the BAP and EU policy framework with 
respect to measures for residual impacts on biodiversity outside Natura 2000 sites‘) and 25 (‗there is 










3.  The Practical Challenges 
 
In this section I select a number of the main concerns which emerge from the 
literature about whether equivalent ecological functions or services are created by 
replacement habitat.
26
 Because of the focus of the article, these are primarily drawn 
from the literature on ex ante compensation obligations; however, there are obviously 
respects in which they also apply to ex post obligations, which are also drawn on as 
appropriate. Some of this literature relates to site specific compensation measures, 
such as those provided as a matter of law, for example in the Netherlands, and 
elsewhere as a matter of policy. But much of the literature relates to biobanking, 
especially from US experience with wetland mitigation banking and, more recently, 
habitat conservation banking. Under such regimes, land of ecological value is created, 
restored or preserved and made available to developers who must ‗buy‘ habitat 
mitigation (in the form of credits) in order to get development consent.
27
 The habitat 
                                                 
24
 In Decision VI/26 the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted 
the Strategic Plan for the Convention, under which Parties committed themselves ‗…to achieve by 
2010 a significant reduction of the current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national 
level as a contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on earth‘. In the EU, the 
commitment was to ‗halting biodiversity loss by 2010‘ (Gothenburg summit 2001; 2002 6th 
Environmental Action Programme). This is now a commitment to halt biodiversity loss and the 
degradation of ecosystem services, and restoring them where feasible, by 2020, Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity Strategy to 
2020, COM (2011) 244 final. 
25
 ‗The Commission will carry out further work with a view to proposing by 2015 an initiative to 
ensure there is no net loss of ecosystems and their services (e.g. through compensation or offsetting 
schemes), COM (2011) 244, ibid, 12. 
26
 These issues have recently been analysed by C Reid, ‗The Privatisation of Biodiversity? Possible 
New Approaches to Nature Conservation Law in the UK‘ (2011) 23 JEL 203, 214-219. 
27
 Most of the US literature on wetland mitigation banking predates rule changes in 2008 (under 33 
C.F.R. pt. 332 (Corps of Engineers); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (Environmental Protection Agency), however, it 
has been argued by Murphy and others that: ‗Unfortunately, the new rule does little beyond codifying a 
status quo that makes it far too easy for the Corps to continue its history of falling short of its charge to 
protect aquatic resources... this new rule allows for far too much discretion by Corps officials to allow 
mitigation to occur where avoidance or minimization should instead be required. It also includes too 
few safeguards to ensure that mitigation serves to successfully compensate for lost functions and values 
of impacted waters‘ (J Murphy, J Goldman-Carter and J Sibbing, ‗New Mitigation Rule Promises More 
of the Same: Why the Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail to Protect Our Aquatic Resources 
Adequately‘ (2009) 38 Stetson L Rev 311, 312-3). For a more cautiously optimistic assessment 
Gardner and others note, ‗although the new regulation represents significant progress, much depends 
on implementation in the field and the degree to which the regulatory provisions are viewed by the 
Corps as discretionary or obligatory‘ (R Gardner and others, ‗Compensating for Wetland Losses under 
the Clean Water Act (Redux): Evaluating the Federal Compensatory Mitigation Regulation‘ (2009) 38 
Stetson L Rev 213, 248). Furthermore, as noted by e.g. Madsen and others, banking extends well 
beyond the US with ‗39 existing programs around the world, and another 25 in various stages of 
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loss is then compensated in geographical areas remote from the development site 
under the guidance and management of an environmental/ecological authority. 
 
Since habitat ‗banks‘ are generally justified on grounds of greater effectiveness and 
efficiency than individualised, site-specific, compensation, this seems a reasonable 
approach. But care has to be taken in extrapolating from banking to site-specific 
compensation. For banking systems to work, relatively simple currencies (like acres) 
are likely to be preferred to make the market sufficiently liquid.
28
 High liquidity also 
requires quick trades. So habitat markets generally assign credits ex ante and 
regulators are not likely to match, in detail, the impact and the compensation 
measures, because this would make the market too thin and ineffective. Also, much of 
the literature on ecological banking relates to wetland banking which is the longest 
established and most widespread, but may in principle be somewhat easier to recreate 
than other forms of habitat.
29
   
 
Hence, I take some of the concerns associated with banking, both empirically and in 
the theoretical literature, and use these to construct a set of propositions about how 
compensation obligations may be prone to failure. At this stage I do not infer that 
these represent the current state of ecological compensation; indeed some of the 
problems I identify have been partially or fully addressed by changes in law and in 
policy guidance.
30
 Also, much of the literature consists of ex post assessments of 
compensation measures and, as such, the most recent examples of current practice are 
not well represented in this literature. Following analysis of the compensation 
obligation under the Habitats Directive (in section 4) I then test these propositions 
against the Commission‘s Article 6(4) opinions. 
 
3.1 Proposition 1: compensation in practice is poor on providing comparable 
ecological functionality 
                                                                                                                                           
development or investigation‘, B Madsen, N Carroll and K Moore Brands, ‗State of Biodiversity 
Markets Report: Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide‘ (2010) 59 
<http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/documents/acrobat/sbdmr.pdf> accessed 27 July 2011. 
28
 J Salzman and J B Ruhl, ‗Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law (2000-01) 53 
Stanford L Rev 607, 646 (‗Fat markets are sloppy ...thin markets are bland‘). The authors suggest that 
barter rather than a commodity market may be a better description of the realities, 683. 
29
 R Morris and others ‗The Creation of Compensatory Habitat – Can it Secure Sustainable 
Development?‘ (2006) 14 Journal for Nature Conservation 106 (‗Compensatory habitat creation can 
probably be used in some wetlands and intertidal environments, but the prospects for success in many 
terrestrial situations are far less certain‘). 
30
 A good example is the Threatened Species Conservation Amendment (Biodiversity Banking) Act 
2006 in Australia, which attempts to build on US experience of banking and address the challenges 
these initiatives generated, L Fromond, J Similä and L Suvantola, ‗Regulatory Innovations for 
Biodiversity Protection in Private Forests—Towards Flexibility‘ (2009) 21 JEL 1 (noting in particular 
greater stipulation about trading of like-for-like). 
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Compared to emissions trading, where there is a relatively agreed and common 
‗currency‘,31 and equivalent impact regardless of where emissions or their reduction 
take place, there is no such quantifiability or fungibility with habitat: no compensation 
will fully produce ‗like for like‘ habitat.32 What is being compared is not just impact 
but ecological value; what is lost with what is being claimed to be created. 
 
Experience with site-specific compensation, especially with wetlands in the US, 
suggests that this led to ‗a proliferation of ―postage stamp‖ mitigation sites that 
presented serious administrative monitoring and enforcement concerns …[and] 
generally failed to produce compensatory wetland resource values‘.33 As a result, 
under a flexible agency interpretation of section 404 Clean Water Act 1972, there is 
scope for developers to discharge their obligations via a wetland mitigation bank. 
There has been a dramatic rise in the number of banks since the early 1990s.  
 
It has been said that ‗the difficulty of measuring and comparing the equivalency of 
debits in impacted areas with credits in proposed offsets or existing banks is one of 
the most difficult challenges to establishing habitat banking systems. It is also a 
complex subject that is rapidly developing‘.34 Analyses of the early years of 
mitigation banking, however, tended to be critical. For example, a seminal 2001 study 
by the National Resources Council concluded that the goal of no net loss
35
 was not 
being met, although the rate of wetland loss had apparently slowed.
36
 Surveying the 
literature in 2000, Salzman and Ruhl found that:  
 
assessment methods in actual use in wetlands mitigation banks have advanced very little from 
the beginning of the decade ... the trading currency has stagnated at the relatively crude acre-
based form ... In practice, most habitat trades to date in wetlands and HCP programs have 
                                                 
31
 Though differences may be masked by various devices, eg producing a common currency of global 
warming potential to cover the main greenhouse gases involves decisions about the potential of each of 
the gases about which there are differences in knowledge, see Salzman and Ruhl (n 28) 629. 
32
 On the challenges generally of trading non-fungibles through allegedly ‗common‘ currencies see 
Salzman and Ruhl (n 28). 
33
 JB Ruhl, A Glen and D Hartman ‗A Practical Guide to Habitat Conservation Banking Law and 
Policy‘ (2005) 20 Natural Resources and Environment 26. See also M Bean and L Dwyer, ‗Mitigation 
Banking as an Endangered Species Conservation Tool‘ (2000) 30 Envtl L Rep 10537, 10538-9 (‗The 
track record of traditional, project-by-project wetland mitigation is dismal‘). 
34
 eftec, IEEP and others (n 23) 82. 
35
 National Research Council, Compensating for Wetland Losses under the Clean Water Act (Natl Acad 
Press 2001) 2. 
36
 See also on this J Kaiser ‗Recreated Wetlands No Match For Original‘ Science, Vol 293 No 5527, 25 
(6 July 2001). 
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A 2004 report also found that compensation was good on acreage but poor on 
function,
38
 although elsewhere it has been suggested that overall compensatory 
measures fall short both in terms of acreage and, in particular, functionality, and have 
been especially inadequate in replacing the ecosystem functions of more complex 
wetland types such as forest wetlands.
39
 Tellingly, this report found that 67% of 
projects met permit conditions, but only 17% could be considered adequate functional 
replacements for the impacted wetlands. Similar gaps, both in terms of non-
compliance and effectiveness, have been found in further studies, although it may be 
that the effectiveness gap reflects the length of time that it may take for newly created 
habitats to stabilise and mature, which may be far in excess of the time allowed under 
existing regulations.
40
 As the 2001 National Resources Council report concluded, ‗[i]t 
is of paramount importance that the regulatory agencies consider each permitting 
decision over broader geographic areas and longer time periods, i.e., by modifying the 
boundaries of permit decision-making in time and space‘.41  
 
Overall, there are significant concerns about how effective compensation measures 
can be.
42
 Although site-specific measures should in principle be more attuned to the 
specific losses and gains involved, they may suffer from ecological economies of 
scale, or compensate for more easily identified losses or more easily reproduced 
gains. If compensation for wetlands is poor, it would seem unlikely that it is any more 
effective for more complex habitats.  
 
                                                 
37
 Salzman and Ruhl (n 28) 660, 665. See also P Brown and C Lant, ‗The Effect of Wetland Mitigation 
Banking on the Achievement of No-net-loss‘ (1999) 23 Environmental Management 333. 
38
 R Ambrose and S Lee, Guidance Document for Compensatory Mitigation Projects 
Permitted Under Clean Water Act Section 401 by the Los Angeles Regional Quality Control Board 
(UCLA 2004). 
39
 P Minkin and R Ladd, Success of Corps Required Wetland Mitigation in New England (US Army 
Corps of Engineers, New England District, 3 April 2003).  
40
 Eg, Wetlands in Washington State Volume 1: A Synthesis of the Science. Washington State 
Department of Ecology, Publication 05-06-006 (2005), para 6.11 (‗Studies relying solely on permit 
files and databases indicated that permitting programs have improved over time in terms of wetland 
acreage required for compensation. However, studies which relied on site visits and field analyses 
indicated that compensatory wetland mitigation has resulted in a loss of wetland acreage ... Some 
unique types of wetlands, such as bogs, fens, and mature forested wetlands, may not be reproducible, 
especially not within current regulatory timeframes‘); see also eftec, IEEP and others (n 23) 80. 
41
 National Research Council (n 35) 10. 
42
 Morris and others (n 29)  note that ‗compensatory habitat creation ... cannot be relied upon in all 
circumstances as means of offsetting loss of the highest quality habitat, and cannot be seen as a 
consistent and reliable delivery mechanism for sustainable development‘. 
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3.2 Proposition 2: compensation in practice favours the proponents by 
underestimating impacts and overestimating the positive effects of compensatory 
measures. 
 
Development interests may prevail in making compensation decisions not simply 
because economic interests carry more weight, but because assessment methodologies 
tend to underestimate impacts and overestimate the positive effects of compensatory 
measures. Owens and Cowell note, with some exceptions, that:  
 
application-specific bargaining over impacts and compensation is almost invariably a 
secretive process, to which the developer has privileged access. Most of what passes for 
―environmental compensation‖ has accommodated the interests of developers more 




The findings of any inquiry reflect what is looked for. As such there may be a 
tendency to under- or over-recognise ecological value depending on whether one is 
considering, for example in an assessment under the Habitats Directive, the site to be 
destroyed or the value of the replacement habitat.  Proponents‘ perspectives and 
valuations – ‗proponents‘ here being both the developer undertaking the assessment 
and the member state advancing the compensation - may therefore both lean towards 
their own perceived interests. Such perspectives or interests may carry considerable 
weight in decision making processes. As Fox and Nino-Murcia found in relation to 
US conservation banking, for example: 
 
biological surveys completed to support a banking agreement recognized more ecological 
value than previous environmental impact surveys conducted for the purposes of mitigating 
development. Impact assessment may underestimate ecological consequences, thereby 
reducing mitigation requirements, whereas a prospective conservation bank may inflate 
ecological values to optimize numbers of credits awarded. Ultimately, when the mitigation 




Under-valuation can be addressed through precaution by requiring ratios – of acreage 
of habitat lost to habitat created - above 1:1 which, as well as respecting functionality 
and taking likely degrees of ineffectiveness into account, is also a way of factoring in 
under- and over-valuation.  
                                                 
43
 Owens and Cowell (n 21) 121, footnote 41, citing R Cowell, ‗Stretching the Limits: Environmental 
Compensation, Habitat Creation and Sustainable Development‘ (1997) Trans Inst Br Geogr, New 
Series, 22(3), 292 who write that ‗the use of habitat creation as a form of environmental compensation 
has tended to accommodate those interest well-represented in the planning system, particularly major 
developers‘ (293). 
44
 J Fox and A Nino-Murcia, ‗Status of Species Conservation Banking in the United States‘ (2005) 
Conservation Biology 996, 1005. 
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3.3 Proposition 3: compensation in practice is poorly monitored and audited and of 
limited enforceability. 
 
A further criticism of compensation is that, even if appropriate metrics are used, it 
may not be subject to sufficient management measures to make it work or monitoring 
measures to verify whether it is effective or likely to be so.
45
 Whether there is 
sufficient funding and institutional support will also be relevant. It is certainly the 
case, with banking, that the developer and the banker are the main actors and neither 
has a particularly powerful incentive to produce and maintain high quality habitat.
46
 
There is no reason to suppose that site-specific measures are any less prone to this, 
which can be seen as a further instance of possible proponent bias because 
compensatory measures which are not adequately monitored and enforced are more 
likely to be exaggerated. Compensation arrangements require a strong degree of 
regulatory oversight to be effective,
47
 no more so than in relation to monitoring. 
 
Banking in particular is also likely to have limited scope for third party involvement. 
This may not be the case with site-specific compensation in major developments, 
however, which in practice tends to have more involvement of third party 




3.4 Proposition 4: economic considerations may improperly or unduly be taken into 
account 
 
                                                 
45
 Government Accountability Office, Wetlands Protection: Corps of Engineers Does Not Have an 
Effective Oversight Approach to Ensure That Compensatory Mitigation Is Occurring (Sept 2005) 
(finding both monitoring and enforcement of mitigation to be poor; barely half required monitoring, 
and in less than a quarter of those was there evidence of monitoring, and few compliance inspection 
reports were submitted); P W Edgar, R A Griffiths and J P Foster, ‗Evaluation of Translocation as a 
Tool for Mitigating Development Threats to Great Crested Newts (Triturus Cristatus) in England, 
1990-2001‘ (2005) 122 Biological Conservation 45. 
46
 Especially as banking has shifted from an essentially not-for-profit to for-profit enterprise, see 
Murphy and others (n 27) 317. 
47
 Although compensation and banking can be conceptualised as ‗privatisation‘, this is misleading. J 
Salzman and JB Ruhl, ‗―No Net Loss‖: Instrument Choice in Wetlands Protection‘ in J Freeman and C 
Kolstad (eds) Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of 
Experience (OUP 2006) 337 in which the authors note that ‗there is no invisible hand at work here. It 
falls on this agency, which is not a market participant, to ensure the quality of the restored wetlands 
because neither the buyer nor seller have incentive to do so‘. See also AM Dodd, ‗EU Habitats 
Directive and Habitat Compensation‘, unpublished thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 2007. 
48
 R Cuperus and others, ‗Preparation and Implementation of Seven Ecological Compensation Plans for 
Dutch Highways‘ (2002) 29 Environmental Management 736, 746; R Lawton, ‗Ecological 
Compensation Within the UK Planning System: The Effect of Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive on 
Three South Coast Port Developments‘ (2007) 18 J Water Law 47. 
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Whilst ecological compensation obligations should be cast in cost-oblivious terms, in 
practice economic considerations may intrude. There are two main ways in which this 
occurs. Compensation issues may not be adequately distinguished from the prior 
question of the justifications for the development. Equally, compensation measures 
may be considered disproportionate on economic grounds. In both cases, economic 
factors are brought in to the compensation issue. Neither of these seems to respect 
ecological impact neutrality. 
 
Generally, compensation issues are engaged after proper consideration of impacts and 
the search for less damaging alternatives, a sequential approach which is widely 
followed in ecological compensation regimes.
49
 This approach is premised on the 
economic or other rationale for the ecological loss having already been determined. 
However, Cuperus and others, for example, note that in Dutch highway development, 
where an ecological compensation policy principle has applied since 1993,
50
 there is 
an ‗undesirable entanglement of the fundamental debate on the development itself 
with discussion of any compensation measures associated with each of the 
alternatives‘.51  
 
The example of EU nature conservation law bears out how economic considerations 
have encroached on what ought to be regarded as purely ecological decisions. This is 
exemplified by failure to designate habitat under the Wild Birds Directive being 
justified by the Member States concerned on the basis that economic factors should be 
taken into account when designating. Affected parties have also sought to argue that 
economic considerations should be relevant when sites are designated under the 
Habitats Directive. The Court of Justice has rejected this line of argument for both 
Directives,
52
 but such litigation indicates the pressures on decision makers to promote 
economic objectives at the expense of compensating ecological losses.  
 
                                                 
49
 R Gardner, ‗Rehabilitating Nature: A Comparative Review of Legal Mechanisms that Encourage 
Wetland Restoration Efforts‘ (2003) 52 Cath U L Rev 573, 613-4. Exceptions include environmental 
assessment under the US National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (‗NEPA‘), see D Mandelker, NEPA 
Law and Litigation (Thomson/West updated), § 8.57; T Schoenbaum and R Stewart, ‗The Role of 
Mitigation and Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with Environmental Regulatory 
Statutes: Lessons from Section 316 of the Clean Water Act‘ (2000) 8 NYU Envtl LJ 237, 277. 
50
 Under the National Structure Plan for Rural Areas. 
51
 R Cuperus and others, ‗Ecological Compensation in Dutch Highway Planning‘ (2001) 27 
Environmental Management 75, 84 (citing earlier work). 
52
 Case C-355/90 Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-4221 (‗Marismas de Santoña‘); Case C-44/95 R v 
Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte Royal Society for the Protection of Birds [1997] QB 
206 (‗Lappel Bank‘) (both Wild Birds Directive); Case C-371/98 R v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte First Corporate Shipping Ltd [2001] ECR I-9235; 
Case C-226/08 Stadt Papenburg v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] Env LR 19 (Habitats Directive). 
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A separate issue is just how cost-oblivious compensation decisions should be. 
Environmental regulation tends to recoil from the notion that legal obligations should 
be completely cost-blind, for example because of the perceived disproportionality of 
the costs of eliminating all risks (the ‗last 10 percent‘ issue).53 Some ecological 
restoration obligations are consciously cast, or interpreted, in terms of what is 
reasonable, for example in terms of costs and benefits.
54
 Similar points might be made 





4.  The Habitats Directive Compensation Obligation 
 
I turn now to the Habitats Directive, the central legal provision at EU level for the 
conservation of biodiversity. The Directive applies both to listed natural habitat types, 
and to listed species. It provides for the creation and maintenance of a network of sites 
– Natura 2000 sites – across separate biogeographical regions of the EU, as well as 
specific provisions about interference with species. Potentially harmful plans or 
projects must be assessed, under Article 6(3), for their impacts on site integrity. If 
negative effects are envisaged, then development harmful to a Natura 2000 site may 
be allowed if there are no alternatives, if there are imperative reasons of overriding 
public interest (which may include economic and social reasons), and if compensatory 
measures are taken (and communicated to the Commission) which ensure the overall 
coherence of the Natura 2000 network. If the site hosts a priority habitat or species, 
stricter tests apply: development may only be authorised on economic or social 
grounds following an opinion in the affirmative from the European Commission. 
 
In particular, the Directive seeks to strike a balance between the common interest of 
the EU in conserving natural heritage, and the responsibilities of the Member States in 
achieving this. A good illustration is in the way that special areas of conservation – 
which, alongside areas designated under the EU Wild Birds Directive, make up 
Natura 2000 - are designated. Although the process is essentially a scientific, 
technocratic one, there is regulatory room built into it so that there is an element of 
                                                 
53
 S Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Harvard UP 1993) 11. See 
generally T McGarity ‗The Goals of Environmental Legislation‘ (2004) 31 BC Envtl Aff L Rev 529. 
54
 Eg, art 1(6), 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, which states 
that ‗compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment 
shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken‘. 
55
 A Heyes, ‗Cutting Environmental Penalties to Protect the Environment‘ (1996) 60 J Public 
Economics 251. 
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burden sharing between the Member States, so that those which are comparatively 




The extent to which the Habitats Directive marks a step away from a ‗best efforts‘ 
instrument can be seen in a judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU on the 
interpretation of Article 6(3) of the Directive: 
 
As regards, in particular, installations not subject to authorisation under the BImSchG 
[Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz], the fact that that text requires verification, that serious 
environmental damage which may be prevented by current technology is in fact prevented, 
and that damage which cannot be prevented by current technology is reduced to the minimum, 
cannot be sufficient to ensure compliance with the duty laid down in Article 6(3) of the 
Directive. The duty of verification laid down by the BImSchG is not, in any event, capable of 
ensuring that a project relating to such an installation does not adversely affect the integrity of 
the protected site. In particular, the duty to verify whether serious environmental damage, 
which cannot be prevented by current technology, is reduced to the minimum, does not ensure 




The central compensation obligation is Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive. This 
applies to the whole Natura 2000 network
58
 and provides that:  
 
If, in spite of a negative assessment of the implications for the site
59
 and in the absence of 
alternative solutions, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons 
of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, the Member State 
shall take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 
2000 is protected. It shall inform the Commission of the compensatory measures adopted.  
Where the site concerned hosts a priority natural habitat type and/or a priority 
species, the only considerations which may be raised are those relating to human health or 
                                                 
56
 ‗Whereas it is recognized that the adoption of measures intended to promote the conservation of 
priority natural habitats and priority species of Community interest is a common responsibility of all 
Member States; whereas this may, however, impose an excessive financial burden on certain Member 
States given, on the one hand, the uneven distribution of such habitats and species throughout the 
Community and, on the other hand, the fact that the ‗polluter pays‘ principle can have only limited 
application in the special case of nature conservation, Habitats Directive, preamble, recital 11; ‗Each 
Member State shall contribute to the creation of Natura 2000 in proportion to the representation within 
its territory of the natural habitat types and the habitats of species‘, Habitats Directive (n 1) art 3(2). 
57
 Case C-98/03 Commission v Germany [2006] ECR I-00053 [43]. 
58
 That is, special protection areas designated under Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on 
the conservation of wild birds [2009] OJ L20/7 (the EU Wild Birds Directive) and Special Areas of 
Conservation under the Habitats Directive. Sites that ought to have been designated as SPAs remain 
subject to the less flexible provisions of art 4(4) of the Wild Birds Directive, see Case C-374/98, 
Commission v France (‗Basses Corbières‘) [2000] ECR I-10799. For sites which ought to be included 
as SACs, or which are pending formal inclusion in Natura 2000, see Case 244/05 Bund Naturschutz in 
Bayern eV and others v Freistaat Bayern [2006] ECR I-08445 (‗Member States cannot therefore 
authorise interventions which may pose the risk of seriously compromising the ecological 
characteristics of a site‘, [46]). In practice, an art 6(3) and (4) approach seems to suffice and has been 
used (Karlsruhe / Baden-Baden opinion). 
59
 Following an ‗appropriate assessment‘ under art 6(3) of the Directive. 
Comment [CJH1]: Does this have to be 
indented? Better without? 
 
DM – I agree 
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public safety, to beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment or, 





This provision was included in the Habitats Directive as a direct legislative response 
to the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Leybucht case involving 
damage to a special protection area (SPA) by dyke works and the strengthening of 
coastal defences.
61
 Leybucht concerned the first sentence of Article 4(4) of the 1979 
Wild Birds Directive, obliging Member States to ‗take appropriate steps to avoid 
pollution or deterioration of habitats or any disturbances affecting the birds, in so far 
as these would be significant having regard to the objectives of this Article‘.  
 
The Court held that ‗the power of the Member States to reduce the extent of a special 
protection area can be justified only on exceptional grounds [which] must correspond 
to a general interest which is superior to the general interest represented by the 
ecological objective of the directive‘.62 The Court accepted that the danger of flooding 
and the protection of the coast were sufficiently serious reasons justifying the works.
63
 
On the other hand, works which had a purely economic basis – in enabling fishing 
vessels access to harbour – did not justify a derogation from Article 4(4). However, 
these works were allowable because they resulted in a reduction in pressure on the 
SPA and because they exposed an extensive area of it to tidal movements and allowed 
the formation of ecologically valuable salt meadows. Hence, the fishing interest could 
be taken into account ‗because there were … offsetting ecological benefits, and solely 
for that reason‘.64  
 
The Leybucht case triggered, at a relatively late stage in the adoption of the Habitats 
Directive, the step-wise approach to justified damage to Natura 2000 sites found in 
Article 6.
65
 And while the Habitats Directive amended Article 4(4) of the Birds 
Directive to provide, across both regimes, that economic and social factors could, 
                                                 
60
 Notably, art 2(1a) of the EU Environmental Liability Directive excludes damage ‗expressly 
authorised by the relevant authorities in accordance with provisions implementing Article 6(3) and (4)‘ 
of the Habitats Directive. 
61
 Case C-57/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-883. 
62
 ibid [21]-[22]. 
63
 ibid [23]. 
64
 Ibid [25]-[26]. 
65
 D Freestone and H Somsen ‗The Enforcement of the Wild Birds Directive: A Case Study‘ in H 
Somsen (ed) Protecting the European Environment: Enforcing EC Environmental Law (Blackstone 
Press 1997) 229. 
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unless priority habitats or species were concerned,
66
 override conservation interests in 
Natura 2000 sites,
67
 the compensation duty remained.  
 
4.1 Opinions: Status and Function 
 
Opinions are prepared by the Environment Directorate-General Environment of the 
Commission, which has responsibility for EU conservation legislation, but approved 
by the whole College of Commissioners. Opinions are not directly legally binding, in 
the sense that their content must be followed.
68
 Procedurally, however, failure to seek 
an opinion where required seems to be unlawful. In a recent decision, the Spanish 
Supreme Court held that the failure of the Spanish authorities to seek the opinion of 
the Commission in relation to motorway construction works affecting a priority site 
was a ground in its own right to declare the authorisation null.
69
 Even if this 
interpretation were not to be followed by the Court of Justice of the EU, it must still 
be the case that failure to obtain a positive opinion from the Commission may make it 
difficult for a Member State to show that permitting the damaging work will not 
adversely affect site integrity.
70
 It is perhaps notable that the Commission‘s own 





On the function of opinions, Commission Guidance states:  
 
                                                 
66
 There is some uncertainty about this, which has not been ruled upon by the Court of Justice of the 
EU. 
67
 In practice, economic justifications lie behind all the positive opinions issued by the Commission, 
see further section 5. 
68
 Article 288 TFEU. ‗From its nature, the opinion is not an act having binding legal effects. The 
national authorities can move away from it and decide to implement the plan or project, even if the 
opinion is adverse. In the latter case however, one can reasonably expect that the decision will address 
the Commission‘s arguments and explain why its opinion has not been followed. In any case the 
Commission can assess whether the implementation of the plan or project is in conformity with the 
requirements of Community law and, if necessary, initiate appropriate legal action‘ (European 
Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites: The Provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’ Directive 
92/43/EEC (2001), para 5.5.3; replicated in European Commission, Guidance Document on Article 
6(4) of the 'Habitats Directive' 92/43/EEC, Clarification of the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, 
Imperative Reasons of Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, 
Opinion of the Commission (2007) 1.8.3, both available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm#art6> accessed 20 
July 2011. 
69
 Appeal No. 1511/2008, Spanish Supreme Court, 14 Feb 2011. ‗Madrid motorway is illegal, says 
Spanish court‘, ENDS Europe, 21 February 2011,  
<http://www.endseurope.com/25641/madrid-motorway-is-illegal-says-spanish-court?referrer=search> 
accessed 26 July 2011; see also ‗EEB Member Organisation Leads an Environmental Rights Victory in 
Spain‘ <http://www.eeb.org/publication/2008/Meta-49_05.pdf> accessed 18 February 2012. 
70
 Nollkaemper (n 3) 283. See also de Sadeleer (n 4) 250. 
71
 Opinions in TGV East, Rotterdam and Bothnia (all 2003). 
 19 
The opinion has to cover the assessment of the ecological values which are likely to be 
affected by the plan or project, the relevance of the invoked imperative reasons and the 
balance of these two opposed interests, as well as an evaluation of the compensation 
measures. That assessment involves both a scientific and economic appraisal as well as an 
examination of the necessity and proportionality of the realisation of the plan or project with 




Despite Article 6(4) referring to opinions determining whether other imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest justify the development, then, the role of the 
Commission‘s opinion extends to evaluating the compensation measures. For 
Nollkaemper, ‗the Commission is mandated and arguably obliged to review the 
adequacy of compensation‘ and failure to do so would in principle justify 
infringement proceedings against the Member State
73
 under what is now Article 258 
TFEU.
74
 That said, as Krämer notes ‗this has never happened in environmental 
matters (or indeed elsewhere)‘.75 There cannot be direct third party oversight of the 




Opinions are subject to ‗conditions‘ addressed to the Member State. It is unclear what 
this means. These are not conditions as might be attached to a legal authorisation, 
where breach is unlawful in itself.  At most any breach of a condition would be an 
evidential issue addressing whether there is a breach of the compensation and 
coherence duties of the Directive, justifying infringement proceedings being taken by 
the Commission against the Member State. Nonetheless, I can only find one example 
of this occurring, seemingly with little enthusiasm.
77
 In any event there seems to be 
little effective monitoring by the Commission. 
 
For Krämer, opinions have been used to green light development projects on the basis 
of standards and reasoning, especially about what is an appropriate consideration of 
alternatives and what counts as an imperative reason of overriding public interest, 
which would not withstand scrutiny were the Court of Justice to rule on them.
78
 This 
                                                 
72
 European Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites (n 68), para 5.5.3. 
73
 The obligation is addressed to the Member State, rather than the developer directly. In most cases, in 
practice the obligation to provide compensation falls on the developer and development consent ought 
to be refused if the developer cannot demonstrate that, through its efforts, the compensation obligation 
is being met. Indeed, under French law compensating measures are expressly ‗for the account of the 
party that will benefit from the works or management or structural activities‘, (Backes and others (n 12) 
77). 
74
 Nollkaemper (n 3) 283. 
75
 Krämer (n 4) 61. 
76
 ‗As opinions are not binding, they cannot, under [art 263(4) TFEU], be challenged in Court, by, for 
example an environmental organisation or an individual.‘ Krämer (n 4) 61. 
77
 Mühlenberger Loch opinion (2000). 
78
 Krämer (n 4), 84 (‗In my opinion, not one of the positive Commission Opinions would, with the 
reasoning made, successfully survive scrutiny by the Court of Justice‘). 
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is due in part to a deferential approach towards assessing the adequacy of 
compensation. The Commission‘s 2007 Guidance states that information should 
merely ‗enable the Commission to appreciate the manner in which the conservation 
objectives of the site in question are pursued in a particular case‘. (As it was put in my 
discussion with Commission officials, it is the ‗logic of the argumentation‘ that 
matters.) Moreover, the extent of Commission deference is further illustrated by the 
understandable stance taken in its Guidance that ‗it is not the Commission's role either 
to suggest compensatory measures, or to validate them scientifically‘.79 
 
4.2 The Nature of the Compensation Obligation  
 
Whilst a strict construction the meaning of ‗compensation‘ is to be deduced from the 
Directive itself, the Directive does not directly flesh out what it means.
80
 Nonetheless 
the primary obligation under the Directive is to ensure that listed habitats and species 
are maintained or restored at a ‗favourable conservation status‘.81 Natura 2000 sites 
are to form a ‗coherent‘ European ecological network. This bypasses the contested 
issue of whether compensation provides results which are ‗natural‘ or authentic,82 
though the concepts of ‗coherence‘ and ‗conservation status‘ inevitably lack clarity, 
and are prone to significant information deficits. Moreover, the duty emphasises the 
species or habitat type generally, rather than individual specimens or particular areas 
of habitat type.  So the Article 6 compensation duty is a particular kind of ‗impact 
neutral‘ measure because it is the impact to the network that must be compensated.  
 
Of central importance to the present analysis, guidance first issued by the 
Commission in 2001
83
 and then revised and enlarged in 2007,
84
 has sought to interpret 
what compensation entails. The Guidance is expressed to be non-binding, and is 
probably not exhaustive of potential ways of complying with the compensation duty. 
As a matter of law, however, Advocate-General Bot has noted that it serves to restrict 
discretion,
85
 and acting ‗outside Guidance‘ may, as a mixed matter of law and 
practice, be regarded as risky.
86
  
                                                 
79
 Commission, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) (n 68) 1.7. 
80
 Contrast the Environmental Liability Directive (n 17), which to some extent indicates how this is to 
be approached in terms of resources and services. 
81
 Habitats Directive (n 1) art 2. 
82
 K Rundcrantz and E Skaerbaek, ‗Environmental Compensation in Planning: A Review of Five 
Different Countries With Major Emphasis on the German System‘ (2003) 13 European Environment 
204, 222. See generally R Elliot, Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration (Routledge 
1997). 
83
 Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites (n 68). 
84
 Commission, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) (n 68). 
85
 Case C-362/06P Sahlstedt v Commission, 23 October 2008, [96]–[97] (‗the Community institutions 
establish ever narrower limits on the discretion enjoyed by the competent national authorities. Thus, the 
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The Guidance has always provided that compensation should be genuinely additional 
to protection and management measures that would in any case have been required;
87
 
that proposing compensation at the beginning of a project process should not remove 
the need for proper consideration of impact and alternatives;
88
 and that compensation 
measures are a ‗last resort‘. The Guidance has been amended slightly to remove the 
criteria of ‗exceptional‘ when referring to when it might be appropriate to compensate 
by adding an existing site to the Natura 2000 network, which may give more 




The Guidance has been significantly enlarged upon by indicating the range of 
measures that might be deemed compensatory (both bio-physical alterations, and legal 
changes such as acquiring land rights);
90
 the matters that ought to be included in any 
programme of compensatory measures (covering such things as close liaison between 
the authorities and the proponent, clear objectives according to the conservation 
objectives of the site, analysis of the measures‘ feasibility, implementation schedule, 
public consultation, monitoring and financing);
91
 criteria for designing the 
compensatory measures, which must be ecological, precautionary, and ‗clearly refer 
to the structural and functional aspects of the site integrity, and the related types of 
habitat and species populations that are affected‘;92 the timing of compensation 
(compensation should be in place when the site is irreversibly affected, but time lags 
may be acceptable where there is no other way to create the compensation (for 
example as regards forests) and where there is overcompensation for interim losses);
93
 
and a sequential approach to selecting the location of the compensation, starting 
within the Natura 2000 site affected and working outwards.
94
 The 2007 Guidance falls 
short of saying that some kinds of harm might not be compensatable, although it does 
say that:  
 
                                                                                                                                           
Commission has produced a guide to the interpretation of Article 6 of the Directive‘). Generally on 
how guidance shapes law, see S Bell and D McGillivray, Environmental Law (7
th
 edn OUP 2008), 9. 
86
 HM Government, Severn Tidal Power, Potential for Compensatory Measures (2010) 9, available at 
<http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%20mix/ren
ewable%20energy/severn-tp/657-stp-potential-compensatory-measures.pdf> accessed 16 December 
2011. This document notes that ‗developing measures outside Commission guidance would be 
unprecedented. It would involve novel environmental and delivery risks‘. 
87
 Eg, under art 6(2) Habitats Directive. 
88
 And see also A-G Kokott in Case C-239/04 Commission v Portugal (‗Castro Verde‘) [35]. 
89
 Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites (n 68) para 5.4.2; Commission, Guidance Document on 
Article 6(4) (n 68) para 1.4.3. 
90
 Commission, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) (n 68) para 1.4.3. 
91
 ibid para 1.4.4. 
92
 ibid para 1.5.1. 
93
 ibid para 1.5.6. 
94
 ibid para 1.5.5. 
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Member States should pay particular attention when the negative effects of a plan or project 
are produced in rare natural habitats types or in natural habitats that need a long period of time 
to provide the same ecological functionality. Under these circumstances, the zero option 




In particular, with respect to ‗overall coherence‘, the Guidance now provides more 
detail about comparable functionality: for Habitats Directive sites, ‗the role played by 
the site concerned in relation to the biogeographical distribution has to be replaced 
adequately‘ and compensation should provide ‗the properties and functions 
comparable to those which had justified the selection of the original site‘. For SPAs 
under the Wild Birds Directive, where there is no biogeographical approach and sites 
are selected nationally, ‗compensation should fulfil the same purpose that motivated 
the site‘s designation‘.96 Functionality rather than, for example, equivalent acreage is 
central. Aspects of woodland biodiversity, for instance, clearly might not be 
compensated for by new forestry plantation: as the latest State of the Environment 
report notes, across Europe the area of forest is increasing, but woodland biodiversity 
is decreasing.
97
 This reflects the fact, amongst other things, that old and dead wood is 
an asset in biodiversity terms. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the Guidance refers 
to ‗comparable‘ functionality, which suggests that there need not be an exact 
replication of functions. 
 
There is also a stress on the effectiveness of the compensation, in terms of its 
feasibility and operationalisation. Compensatory measures must be ‗feasible and 
operational in reinstating the ecological conditions to ensure the overall coherence of 
the Natura 2000 network‘.98 ‗[T]he most effective option ... must be chosen‘, and the 
Guidance does not indicate that cost is a factor in reaching this decision.
99
 In relation 
to technical feasibility, however, the Guidance begins by noting that: 
 
According to current knowledge, it is highly unlikely that the ecological structure and function 
as well as the related habitats and species populations can be reinstated up to the status they 




There is a certain ambiguity about this aspect of the Guidance. For example, this part 
goes on to suggest a general need for ratios ‗well above 1:1‘ as one means of 
overcoming the limits of site-specific compensation, and also the need for 
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 ibid para 1.5.3. 
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overcompensation to address interim losses when the compensation will take time to 
establish. However, the Guidance is ambiguous as to whether this kind of quantitative 
‗overcompensation‘ goes to addressing the general issue about the likelihood that 
ecological structure and function cannot be reinstated. Moreover, this aspect of the 
Guidance, taken as whole, might be taken as suggesting that the compensation duty is, 
to a degree at least, a ‗best efforts‘ obligation, although not a kind of ‗best practicable‘ 
efforts obligation which takes cost factors into account. 
 
 
5.  The Opinions 
 
The 15 opinions publicly issued by the Commission under Article 6(4) of the Habitats 
Directive as at 31 July 2011 span the period from 1996 to 2011. This period can be 
divided at 2001, when Commission Guidance was first published, and again at 
January 2007 when the expanded Guidance was published. Table 1 summarises these 
periods, the developments concerned and the compensation issues involved. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Three opinions (all addressed to Germany, two relating to motorway works - on the 
A20 at Peene Valley and at Trebel and Recknitz valley - in 1995, and to a large 
aircraft factory at Mühlenberger Loch, Hamburg in 2000) were issued before the 2001 
Guidance.  
 
Opinions issued during the second period between 2001 and 2007 concerned the 
Bothnia railway (Sweden 2003); colliery extension at Haniel (Germany 2003); 
industrial and commercial development at Trupbach, North Rhine-Westfalia 
(Germany 2003);
101
 port expansion at Rotterdam (Netherlands 2003); high speed rail 
development, TGV East (France 2004); construction of La Breña II dam (Spain 
2004); the expansion of Karlsruhe / Baden-Baden airport (Germany 2005); and port 
construction at Granadilla, Tenerife (Spain 2006).  
 
Since the 2007 Guidance was published, a third period has seen opinions on extension 
of the Lübeck-Blankensee airport (Germany 2009); A20 motorway construction in 
Schleswig-Holstein (Germany 2010); A49 motorway extension, Hesse (Germany 
2010); and economic development and associated infrastructure at Győr (Hungary 
2011).  
                                                 
101
 With respect to Trupbach the proposal was rejected due to alternatives, and no compensation 
measures were ever proposed. 
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A striking feature of these opinions is that only one (Trupbach) has been negative, and 
in that opinion no compensation measures had been proposed. The Commission, then, 
has never issued a negative opinion on the grounds that the compensation measures 
were deficient. It is also worth noting that the more recent opinions appear to have 
been finalised somewhat more swiftly than previously, though it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to speculate why. 
 
In terms of the functional effectiveness of compensation measures, an overall 
evaluation is impossible. Many of the developments are comparatively recent and a 
full evaluation would require both time and proper ecological assessment. 
Nevertheless, an evaluation can still be made about whether the process appears to 
stand up to scrutiny when set against the four propositions outlined in section 3 and 
whether the compensation issue is treated any differently now compared with the first 
and second phases – in other words about the effect of Guidance on practice. Has 
scrutiny moved on since the 1995 opinions which, according to Nollkaemper, ‗did not 




In terms of functionality, when compensation measures have been proposed these do 
not appear to be wholly inadequate, though in some cases this may be because the 
terms of the compensation requirement are very general or conditional. The 
Commission‘s opinions do not display any of the obvious limitations shown by some 
of the compensation measures notified by Member States to the Commission under 




It is remarkable however that three positive opinions have been given even though the 
compensation measures had not been finalised. This was the case in Bothnia, where 
the ‗view‘ of the Commission was said to be ‗conditional‘ on ‗a comprehensive and 
realistic compensation package‘ being ‗submitted for the Commission‘s evaluation 
and approval before the execution of the project‘.104 It was also the case in Trebel and 
Recknitz, where the Opinion spoke of ‗possible compensatory areas‘. In the third, 
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 Nollkaemper (n 3) 283. 
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 ‗Commonly, the compensatory measures proposed are not related to the impacts caused by the 
project and do not offset for its effects, for instance, building interpretation centres for the site‘, DG 
Environment (n 13) p 4. 
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 there has been ex post evaluation. This – from 2008 - reached 
the uncomfortable finding that ‗[r]emediation measures were started in 2001, but have 
not yet been completed. It is actually not clear if remediation measures will ever be 
completed, and if they are, which form they will take and which results they will 
have‘.106 In cases such as these, even accepting, as the Guidance states, that the 
science is not to be ‗validated‘, it is impossible to see how there can be the 
‗evaluation‘ of the compensation that the Guidance indicates at the time of the 
opinion. 
 
The opinions are somewhat remarkable for their variation when it comes to the issue 
of whether overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network will be protected. Some 
opinions state categorically that there will be no lack of protection of coherence.
107
 
But some opinions (for example Györ) do not state this expressly. In La Brena II, the 
Opinion states that ‗long term overall coherence will not be significantly affected‘; 
this seems to fall short of finding that coherence will be protected. There is also one 
opinion – Haniel – which suggests that the creation of new conservation interests 
which do not compensate for what is lost might still be seen as being relevant because 
of the contribution to the coherence of Natura 2000.
108
 If categorical assurances are 
given in some opinions, it is understandable that negative inferences may be drawn 
when they are not. 
 
A number of the opinions relate to habitat, such as forests, where full ecological 
compensation will take some time. As noted, the Guidance recognises this by 
allowing for interim losses of functionality as an exception to the norm of 
replacement habitat being available when the development site is destroyed. In 
Haniel, there is an express offsetting of long-term temporal losses (of residual alluvial 
forests) with quantity of new planting and of different gains. 
 
For the replacement of alluvial forests (15 ha or 2.5 km of riverside), the very long time periods 
that will be necessary to re-establish habitats with a nature value equivalent to that which will be 
destroyed will be compensated by the creation of equivalent habitats by afforestation and 
improvement of existing forests on a total area that will be 2.5 to 3 times larger than the areas that 
will be affected or destroyed. When compared to the 95 hectares of land with high nature 
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108
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Natura 2000‘. 
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conservation value (including approx. 16 ha of priority habitats), which will be destroyed or 
affected by the project, the planned compensation measures can be considered as an acceptable 
compensation for the habitats that will be lost, at least from a quantitative point of view (emphasis 
added).  
 
Elsewhere, ratios of new to lost habitat of >1 have not always been justified because 
of interim losses.
109
 In Schleswig-Holstein, the damages caused to the priority habitat 
types concerned are said to be compensated overall by a 3:1 ratio. According to the 
German authorities these measures will have taken place before the damages occur. 
(Given the nature of the habitat types involved, this seems optimistic to say the least. 
Indeed, most of the habitat types for which opinions have been issued involve habitats 
which require very long restoration periods.
110
) In Karlsruhe / Baden-Baden, the 
possible inability to compensate for the one priority habitat affected seems to have 
induced generous ratios for some of the non-priority habitats affected. This suggests a 
degree of virement between compensatable and non-compensatable impacts, and 
priority and non-priority habitats. This does not follow the Guidance, and seems a 
dubious interpretation of the Directive.  
 
There is a striking and general lack of transparency about why ratios >1 are being 
offered: is this because of interim losses? For reasons of margin of safety 
precaution?
111
 Or as bargaining? There is some overlap here with the issue of 
proponent bias discussed below. 
 
One consequence of focusing on the coherence of Natura 2000 is that while the 
Commission conceives of overall coherence in relation to the relevant biogeographic 
region, as it must under the Directive, it pays regard to local interests only insofar as 
local compensatory habitat is preferable ecologically in terms of species migration / 
likely success and so on. Direct human interests, such as recreational interests, are 
irrelevant. A similar point might be made about the exclusion of ecosystem service 
values:
112
 the focus is on the contribution of the habitat to the network, and not upon 
ecosystems more widely.  
                                                 
109
 See also Mühlenberger Loch, ‗The area foreseen for the compensation is significantly larger than 
the area exposed to the significant impact‘. 
110
 For an overview of the periods involved for different habitat types see eftec, IEEP and others (n 23) 
80. 
111
 R B Stewart, ‗Environmental Regulatory Decision Making Under Uncertainty‘ (2002) 20 Research 
in Law and Economics 71, 76 (in which the author distinguishes the margin of safety precaution from 
other regulatory aspects of precaution). 
112
 Contrast the Environmental Liability Directive (n 17), which extends to the restoration of ecological 
services. See generally E Barbier and G Heal, ‗Valuing Ecosystem Services‘ (2006) 3 Economists‘ 
Voice 2; G Heal and others, Valuing Ecosystem Services: Toward Better Environmental Decision 





The process of seeking an opinion is inherently proponent biased. Regardless of 
whether the development is public or private, it is the Member State which must seek 
the opinion and which inevitably will be seeking to justify the development in both 
economic and ecological terms to gain a positive opinion. The process is a paper 
exercise,
113
 and the Commission does not adjudicate on factual disputes, for example 
about acreage affected by development. This deference is likely to favour the 





There are no formal avenues for third party involvement, though environmental and 
conservation bodies such as NGOs have often made representations during the period 
the opinion is under consideration. But there is very limited and haphazard 
information about this. Two of the opinions have recorded in bare outline exchanges 
between the Commission and the Member State, and also other stakeholders 
(Rotterdam; TGV East
115
). Interestingly, there is no record of this in the Phase 3 
opinions. This might be because these later opinions have generally been decided 
more swiftly. But it is impossible to know, from the opinions, whether there has been 
any greater or lesser interaction with the Member State or with others. What is 
notable, however, is that no opinion ever records an opponent of the development 
being asked for further information, whereas asking Member States for further 
information is recorded in a number of opinions. Only one opinion (Lübeck) mentions 




                                                                                                                                           
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics and Law‘ (2001) 20 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 
309.  
113
 The Commission has undertaken one site visit (Peene Valley), and has said that it would not rule 
further visits out, but its practice is not to do so. 
114
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A further aspect of potential bias is the extent to which opinions take a precautionary 
approach. In discussion with officials, the Commission professed to base its opinion 
on the worst case and there is some evidence to support this (Rotterdam). But this is 
not always borne out. For example, in Karlsruhe / Baden Baden the worst case was 
that an experimental scheme in relation to provision of compensatory habitat for a 
type of Nardus grassland would not be successful and would result in a small loss of 
habitat. Nevertheless, there was considered to be no reasonably practical alternative. 





Finally, and linking forward to the next sub-section, in the context of the Commission 
not publishing monitoring reports required of Member States, it has been argued that 
‗the suspicion exists that Member States' information on compensatory measures may 
often be rather exaggerated in order to obtain a positive Opinion from the 
Commission‘.118 At least one opinion (Mühlenberger Loch) strongly supports this.119 
 
Monitoring and Enforceability 
 
The Commission does not itself monitor the compensation measures but virtually all 
of the opinions require some degree of monitoring by the member state. However, 
annual (eg Mühlenberger Loch, Haniel, La Brena II, Tenerife) or periodic 
(Rotterdam) monitoring reports, when required, appear not always to have been 
submitted. The practice has been said, by the Commission in discussion, to be that if 
the Member State permit contains strict monitoring and adaptive provisions then these 
will not be duplicated in the opinion. In one case (Lübeck), implementation and 
monitoring reports needed only be made available to the Commission upon request. 
This must present at the least practical problems with third party verification. There is 
no evidence that the later opinions require any more by way of monitoring than the 
earlier opinions did. Nor is it clear that there is any effective check on ensuring that 
stipulations made in opinions about, for example, securing compensatory habitat with 
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Alongside monitoring obligations, a number of opinions also contain adaptive 
management provisions. A typical wording is that ‗The results of the accompanying 
monitoring programme regarding Natura 2000 sites will be taken into account in that 
it may, if need be, lead to appropriate rectification of the project design or to 
additional compensation and/or mitigation measures.‘121 Again, in the absence of 
access to monitoring reports, it is generally impossible to know whether any adaptive 
response has been necessitated or has occurred. In the one case where it is known that 
compensatory measures have not succeeded (Mühlenberger Loch), it remains unclear 
whether adaptive measures will in fact be required. 
 
In general, then, the Commission does not see opinions as licences and appears to 
have little enthusiasm for ongoing case management. However, in 2006 the 
Commission did open infringement proceedings against Germany because of 
concerns about overall coherence following the apparent failure of compensatory 
measures at Mühlenberger Loch, though these proceedings were closed in 2007.
122
  
Whether the closing of these proceedings was appropriate might be questioned, 
however, since it appears to have been done because of planned rather than executed 
compensatory measures. Further infringement proceedings have not been ruled out, 




Finally in this context, it is notable that, in providing 6-yearly information about 
implementation,
124
 the Commission poses, to the Member States, the question ‗What 
is the impact of projects in need of compensation measures on conservation status 
(general overview at national level indicating species or habitats affected by the 
projects, impact of the projects and of the compensations measures, separately if 
possible, area concerned and whether a follow up of the compensation measures was 




The view in the literature is that a generous interpretation is given to economic 
considerations in issuing positive opinions. De Sadeleer suggests that the 
Commission‘s practice in relation to whether imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest (IROPI) ‗seems to be a priori favourable to requests from Member States‘.125 
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It appears that most of the time considering opinions is taken up with IROPI issues 
and liaison with other Directorates General of the Commission.
127
 IROPI is most 
often found on grounds of furthering other Community policies such as those 
concerning energy, transport and ports. My own discussion with Commission officials 
was notable for the conversation being taken back to IROPI, even when the focus was 
more specifically on compensation. It is not at all clear that the element of the public 
interest represented by the protection of natural heritage is examined in the same 
depth as the (invariably) economic case and alternatives to the damaging activity.  
 
Mühlenberger Loch is a good example of how economic factors may contaminate the 
ecological compensation issue. The opinion states that the development is justified by 
IROPI. However, compensatory measures could not be assessed by the date of the 
opinion; indeed they seemed some way off being finalised. Nevertheless, a positive 
opinion was given. This clearly shows a separation of what ought to be joined-up 
issues – the justification and the compensation – with a clear prioritisation of the 
economic rationale, which was accepted as proven, over the ecological safeguarding, 
which was not. Indeed, the German authorities in Mühlenberger Loch split the 
decision to authorise the development from the decisions regarding compensation. 
The result, by 2008, was that ‗whereas the expansion of the Airbus site was completed 
successfully and the first aircraft ... were rolling off the conveyor belt by July 2007, 
the remediation for the filling-in of 171 ha of tidal mudflats protected under German 
and European law is to date nowhere near completion‘.128 
 
Economic factors also seem clearly to have been relevant when the Commission 
dropped infraction proceedings against Spain in relation to the M-501 motorway – in 
favour of assessing the project after it had been completed, which seems 
impermissible under the scheme of the Directive - notwithstanding that Spain had 
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Underpinning all of the above issues are concerns about transparency of decision-
making. Whether or not they show appropriate decision-making about compensation 
issues, the opinions vary little in terms of detail, regardless of the complexity of the 
compensation issue. Opinions - covering all aspects of the decision from alternatives 
and overriding public interest reasons to mitigation and compensation - range from 4 
to 10 pages in length. The lack of detail is extraordinary. Decisions relating to minor, 
innocuous neighbourhood development can be longer and more detailed. The very 
lack of availability of opinions is also a key transparency concern.
130
 There is no duty 
to publish opinions officially, nor any duty to publicise that an opinion has been 
sought (which might allow more ex ante participation and scrutiny). 
 
This lack of transparency undermines what is otherwise a commendable feature of the 
legislation: Commission oversight. In its latest biodiversity strategy, the Commission 
commits itself by 2012 to ‗improve the flow, accessibility and relevance of Natura 
2000 data‘.131 To be sure, opinions are not data, but to be effective and to command 
confidence, the whole process of requiring opinions relies on the communication of 
data both to and from the Commission. Litigation is more likely when political 
opportunity is restricted but legal opportunity is stronger.
132
 It is hardly surprising 
that, in the absence of information, a number of the cases discussed in this Article 
have remained controversial after the Commission has issued its opinion, leading to a 






6.  Conclusion 
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Commission oversight is, in theory, an appropriate check on Member State action in 
the face of conserving areas of common European natural heritage. After many years 
of delay in establishing the Natura 2000 network, the European Commission has 
stated its intention to focus on the protection and management of sites.
134
 Whether the 
Commission can be entrusted with this relies on many factors, not least the reach of 
its powers in an area of shared competence, its historically limited resourcing, and the 
way in which opinions are approved by the College of Commissioners as a whole. But 
it also relies on scrutiny of the Commission‘s own judgements about whether Natura 
2000 sites may be sacrificed in the face of competing interests and the promise of 
offsetting.  
 
Writing in 1997, Nollkaemper excused the Commission‘s ‗soft glance‘ at 
compensation on the grounds of the uncertainties involved, the undeveloped state of 
restoration ecology, and its lack of experience.
135
 It is a somewhat depressing 
conclusion to reach that, looking at the record, and despite the enlargement of the 
Guidance, little seems to have changed. The opinions cast doubt across each of the 
four criteria used here as tests. Moreover the opinions, and their follow up, fail 
spectacularly on transparency.  
 
The Commission has suggested ‗that Member States better design the compensatory 
measures when  ... the opinion of the Commission is required‘.136 This is in contrast to 
the position where Member States merely have a duty to inform, where the 
Commission has noted a ‗remarkable ... lack of understanding of the purpose of 
compensatory measures and the very common low quality of the measures 
proposed‘.137 This is not to conclude that Member State practice is always weak; there 
are examples of incredibly thorough compensation evaluations at national level.
138
 
But even if it is the case that Commission opinions drive better design, design is just 
one aspect of what is a more multi-faceted issue embracing, amongst other things, 
monitoring, enforceability and transparency. If the Commission cannot demonstrate, 
through its published opinions, that it is itself faithful, in letter and spirit, to all aspects 
of the compensation obligation, its leverage over the Member States in relation to the 
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wider range of cases where the compensation obligation applies, and across the 
Habitats Directive regime as a whole, is diminished.  
